

https://doi.org/10.24035/ijit.25.2024.290			
Received:	02 October 2023	Accepted:	3 February 2024
Revised:	21 December 2023	Published:	15 June 2024
Volume:	24 (June)	Pages:	109-121
To cite: Novi Hendri, Saifuddin Zuhri, Maiza Elvira & Ismail 2024. Resistance of Islamist groups to government policies in settlement of religious radicalism. <i>International Journal of Islamic Thought</i> . Vol. 25 (June.): 109-121.			

Resistance of Islamist Groups to Government Policies in the Settlement of Religious Radicalism

NOVI HENDRI*, SAIFUDDIN QUDSY, MAIZA ELVIRA & ISMAIL¹

ABSTRACT

The topic of eradicating and preventing religious radicalism is quite a heavy homework for the Indonesian government. This article discusses the rejection and resistance of Islamic groups who are quite strong against the government's efforts to eradicate and prevent religious radicalism. The resistance has abandoned the classical pattern which is synonymous with violence, and started using strategies that are more easily accepted by society; digital utilization by using social media, and websites to spread their doctrine. Many people are affected, especially young people whose fighting spirit is still very high. This is based on research that the author conducted in 2018 and 2022. This research is the realm of Islamic studies studies, the instrument used in this research is in-depth interviews with the informants involved. The results of the research show that the rejection of Islamist groups occurs in various forms: both soft and hard. Soft rejection occurs through digital spaces, in the form of social-religious movements: recitals or lectures as well as mastery of mosque management. While hard or open rejection, in the form of demonstrations to reject government policies.

Keywords: Government Policy, Islamist Groups, Religion, Resistance, Radicalism.

In 1998, the New Order leadership eventually collapsed and the reform era began. The faucet of democracy is very wide open. As a result, the development of movements that contain elements of radicalism is also unstoppable, marked by the Bali bombing in 2001, three years after reformation was echoed in Indonesia. Since then the government has attempted to eradicate all elements of radicalism (Mohaiyadin, N. M. H. J., & Aman, n.d.), and has worked hard to prevent acts of violence and terror as a direct effect of radicalism. Various policies are made by the government. However, it is not uncommon for policies made by the government to resolve

¹**Novi Hendri*** (Corresponding Author), Ph. D. Assoc. Professor at the Faculty of Ushuluddin, Adab and Dakwah, State of Islamic University, Jln. Gurun Aur Kubang Putih Bukittinggi, INDONESIA. Email: novihendri@uinbukittinggi.ac.id [ORCID iD: 0000-0003-2843-1198].

-Saifuddin Qudsy, Ph. D. Professor at the Faculty of Ushuluddin and Islamic Thought, State of Islamic Sunan Kalijaga University, Jln. Marsda Adisucipto Jogjakarta, INDONESIA. Email: saifuddin.qudsy@uin-suka.ac.id [ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6920-9740].

-Maiza Elvira, M. Hum. Lecturer at the Faculty of Ushuluddin, Adab and Dakwah, State of Islamic University, Jln. Gurun Aur Kubang Putih Bukittinggi, INDONESIA. Email: maizaelvira@gmail.com [ORCID iD: 0009-0004-4169-7454].

-Ismail, Ph. D. Professor at the Faculty Sharia State of Islamic University, Jln. Gurun Aur Kubang Putih Bukittinggi, INDONESIA. Email: ismail@uinbukittinggi.ac.id [ORCID iD: 0009-0001-2300-3701].

religious radicalism to be rejected by various Islamic groups, and various ways are used to reject the policy.

There has been a change in strategy in terms of rejection and resistance carried out by various Islamic radical groups in responding to government policies and actions in efforts to eradicate religious radicalism. Rejection which was originally in the form of frontal action containing conflict and violence, has turned into a tacit rejection, namely through religious activities, fundraising, and convoys which make their activities easy to attract the public's attention. Apart from that, looking at the various phenomena that exist, social media is also one of the tools to carry out this rejection (Saleh & Arbain 2019).

Many sites and accounts used by Islamic groups to carry out propaganda reject the solution to religious radicalization. Rejection was also carried out through lectures, which became an effective program in efforts to spread radical religious views. In addition, giving influence to young people or students through the Campus Da'wah Institute and the Islamic Study Forum was also carried out massively. Observer of terrorism, intelligence and security Stanislaus Riyanta (Maliki et al. 2022), stated that the rejection of this policy will continue to exist with various modifications and changes in strategy in various actions, until the ultimate goal of these actions can be achieved, namely building an Islamic state and replacing the basis of the state, Pancasila, on the basis of Islamic Sharia. Therefore the refusal can be a dangerous action, because it can directly affect people's lives. If this strategy extends and reaches important positions in government, it can influence the decision-making process, and the group's propaganda can create acts of terror by single actors.

So far, not much has been written about the rejection of Islamic groups towards government policies in solving religious radicalization, except for discussions about deradicalization policies with various regulations and programs being carried out. First; *Radicalism in Indonesia: Between Historicity and Anthropicity*. This study tries to analyze the factors that encourage the emergence of radicalism in Indonesia. At least there are 3 factors; namely developments at the global level, the spread of Wahhabism and finally poverty (Ahmat Asrori 2015).

Second; *Religious Radicalism in Indonesia; Contemporary Political Ideology and Power Battles*. Analyzing the existence of movements outside Muhammadiyah and NU, which is referred to as a case of non-mainstream movements in Indonesia which is also a phenomenon of religious movements that have emerged recently in Indonesia. In the process, this non-mainstream religious movement succeeded in carrying out and sustaining its movement ideology. In addition, the study tries to explore the factors that influence the emergence of religious movements, then how the (religious) value system can influence the behavior of a person or group, both in social, economic and political life as well as the impact and influence of these religious movements (Qodir 2014).

Third; *Islamic Radicalism and Islamic Moderation; Efforts to Build a Peaceful Islamic Region*. This article explains that all religions strictly prohibit acts of terror that could threaten the harmony, integrity and diversity of the nation. Terrorism and radicalism are not always ideologically motivated, but non-religious factors are more dominant, such as social, economic, political and others. Therefore, it is necessary to disseminate discourse and a new paradigm of Islamic understanding that is inclusive and tolerant of Islamic moderation (*wasathiyah al-Islām*). The emergence of radical Islamism must be immediately balanced with a vision of moderate Islam. That is the image of Islam which upholds the values of moderation, tolerance and equal rights. Islamic moderation is a middle way in the midst of religious diversity (Faiqah & Pransiska 2018). Based on various existing research studies, studies on Islamic groups can be mapped into three study trends:

First, studies that see Islamist groups as Islamic defenders (Zulfadli 2022). Discussions about Islamic defense groups have existed since ancient times. In West Sumatra, this movement is known as the Padri movement. Padri, which was initiated by Tuanku Imam Bonjol and his friends, is a movement that tries to purify Islam again in Minangkabau land. This movement created a conflict that resulted in the sparks of war between the Padri and indigenous peoples for 18 years. The war between the Paderi and adat then ended with the entry of the Dutch in 1821,

and the war changed direction between the Minangkabau people and the Dutch government. Cristine Dobbin, in her book *Gejolak Ekonomi, Kebangkitan Islam, dan Gerakan Paderi states that during the long war of the 35-year Paderi movement in Minangkabau*, the Padri group emerged as a group of defenders of Islam and the homeland against the immorality of the indigenous people and the colonization of the Dutch (Dobbin 1983). In the years following independence, Islamic defender groups emerged under the DI/TII movement which received much acclaim from the public.

Second, Islamist groups as trans-national groups have a strategic position in spreading radical views (Sham, F. M., Yaqin, A., & Wachidah, n.d.). Besides that, efforts to modernize and promote Islamic indigenism in Indonesia have actually provided opportunities for de-radicalization and the development of radical Islamic movements (Ahmad Najib Burhani 2018). Therefore popularizing moderate Islam is a fairly efficient solution today. As utilized by these radical Islamic groups, social media can also be an effective tool for popularizing moderate Islam.

Third, studies that place Islamic groups as carriers of "disaster" for Islam itself. Many studies have been carried out related to radical Islamic groups such as HTI and so on. This aims to see its development and also the doctrinal strategy carried out by the group, whether it becomes a threat to Pancasila and the diverse life of the Indonesian nation.

Based on the facts, social media has become an efficient tool for radical Islamic groups in infiltrating radicalism in society. Therefore this paper starts from the question; (1) to what extent do websites and social media play a role in doctrinalization of rejection of anti-radicalism policies? (2) What are the activities carried out by Islamist groups in rejecting anti-radicalism policies in social-religious movements in the form of teaching and controlling mosques, establishing foundations or schools to implement ideology, and targeting the younger generation and students? The urgency in this discussion is quite high, because the situation will become quite wild if the government does not immediately address it. The government must involve Islamist groups in solving religious radicalization. Not only taking a security approach, but involving all parties in the context of counter-radicalization and deradicalization. This paper is a response to the lack of discussion regarding this situation, and becomes reference material to see how the development of doctrinal rejection of anti-radicalism policies. This study is based on the argument that there has been a change in doctrinal strategy for rejecting anti-radicalism policies, by utilizing internet media in the form of websites and social media, so that they are more accepted by the public.

Islamist Group

Islamist groups are radical activist groups where one of their main goals is the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia (Ahmad 2023; Khairullin 2022). Islamic groups have a distorted understanding of religious values and conceptual theological dogmas so that this group is always in conflict with the State (Davidenko 2022). The Islamist group is one of the transnational groups. The ideology that is carried is an ideology that promotes the return of "true Islam" by obliging Muslims to establish a caliphate as a system that is willed by God. This ideology frontally opposes democracy, secularization and liberation values (Olsson 2021). The exclusivity of this ideology has the potential to threaten religious tolerance, civil pluralism and social harmony (Al Qurtuby 2020). Nevertheless, Islamist groups can continue to exist and attract public attention. The Islamist group is the strongest, most solid and psychologically able to make great sacrifices both physically and psychologically to their group for two reasons. First, because of the high feeling of awe towards fellow members, and second, because of the fusion of identity with religion (Gómez et al. 2021).

Islamism is a mass movement that aims for social change due to dissatisfaction and disappointment with a regime that is considered authoritarian and does not care about the poverty of the people. Usually, this move is followed by a mass that is quite large and difficult to resist. This has been happening in Indonesia since before independence and has continued and started to reach its peak after the fall of the authoritarian regime Suharto in May 1998. There is a wide open post-Suharto political opportunity that can be exploited by Islamist groups that have long existed in Indonesia.

The Islamic movement that began to rise after the fall of the New Order regime was marked by two models of movement; namely structural and cultural. The first movement model was marked by the rise of the establishment of Islamic parties, such as PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang), PKS (Partai Keadilan Sosial), PKU (Partai Kebangkitan Umat), Partai Masyumi Baru, and PP (Partai Persatuan). The second movement model is characterized by the emergence of Islamic mass organizations, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad (LJ), Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Hizb al-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and following other movements that have existed since the New Order, such as the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (PPMI), and the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (KISDI).

Government Policy (Resolving Radicalism)

The solution to radicalism cannot only be reached through a social approach, but also through a military and political approach. This is based on the argument that radicalism is not only related to social interaction but also involves the process of adopting laws, religious associations, public organizations, political parties and religious and government policies (Shukuralieva and Lipiński 2021). Furthermore, Shukuralieva & Lipiński (2021) stated that these three approaches are important because militaristic radicalism is a threat to state and public security, territorial integrity and military potential. Politically, radicalism threatens state sovereignty, institutions, stability and sustainability of the social order. The Indonesian government's policy based on Pancasila stipulates that the relationship between religion and the state is symbiotic and cannot be separated from one another. So that legal policies against radicalism movements and ideologies are established to maintain unity (Rismawati et al. 2021). The basic effort made to show the existence of Pancasila in fighting radicalism is by reinternalizing Pancasila values through educational institutions (Winarni 2020; Arake, Keri, and Hanafi 2021; Mukhlis & Makhya 2020).

Government policies in solving radicalism are decided in various forms according to the socio-religious context in each country. First; The government adopts policies to ward off radicalism by adopting normative laws, statutes and institutional measures (Sarsembayev et al. 2021). Institutional steps are carried out by establishing state agencies and civic programs. The policies adopted are not aimed at secularization, or vice versa, but at the re-contextualization of Islam which is formed historically and is simultaneously consistent with modernization (Yang & Kozhirova 2021). Second; The government takes constitutional steps, implements the legislature, forms government and public institutions. Furthermore, this institution was specifically assigned to tackle radicalism among young people (Andriyanov 2017). In Indonesia, the resolution of radicalism involves state policy as the highest authority actor

Resistance

Resistance is something that is formed by various repertoires whose meanings are specific to certain times, places and social relations. James C. Scott mentions that class struggle includes any actions taken by the losers, which are aimed at reducing or denying the claims (eg rent, taxes, prestige) made by the upper classes (landlords, wealthy farmers, the State) against with the losers. Scott divided the resistance into two parts, namely; Public or open resistance and Hidden or covered resistance.

The two categories, according to Scott, are distinguished by the articulation of resistance, forms, characteristics, social and cultural areas. Open resistance is characterized by open interactions between subordinate classes and superordinate classes. While closed resistance is characterized by the presence of closed, indirect interactions between subordinate classes. In terms of the resistance of Islamist groups, socio-political control that is implemented through state policies often experiences resistance (Hassan, Mattingly & Nugent 2022). This resistance can occur in three forms, containment, namely closing access to participation; subversion namely the weakening of information and communication channels; and sabotage, namely segregation. The rise of violent movements in the name of religion and radicalism ideology which threatens

the integrity of the State has prompted the State to issue policies against transnational movements such as the movement of Islamic groups (Weill 2020). Government policies in reforming laws aim to reveal social systems and eliminate unequal power relations (Sun and Valenzuela 2021). This step was later rejected by Islamist groups. Resistance to the State is carried out as an attitude of rejecting government legitimacy when there is reform of rules or laws (Fytili 2022).

Resistance to a policy is influenced by both structural and cultural factors. Structural factors are influenced by government-administrative-constitutional actions, for example through the revocation of the legalization of the organization or institution concerned (Alpyspaeva and Abdykarimova 2022). Furthermore, Alpyspaeva & Abdykarimova (2022) explained that in the phenomenon of solving radicalism, the resistance of Islamic groups to institutional policies often occurs due to counter-narratives from both parties. While the cultural factors that trigger the resistance of Islamic groups to government policies, one of them is the notion that Islamic groups, in their internal understanding, are groups that promote social morality based on pure religious doctrines and values. So that the group has a strong urge to show self-existence, regardless of political interests (Facal 2020). Both due to structural factors and cultural factors, resistance occurs because one party feels its existence is threatened because of another party.

Radicalism

In the social sciences, the term radicalism is often used. It is noted that the disciplines of politics, sociology, and history have long used this term to explain certain social phenomena. Initially, the term radicalism was used to describe a peasant protest movement that used religious symbols to reject all existing rules and orders. The term radical is used as an indicator of total rejection of all ongoing conditions. The term social radicalism is characterized by three general tendencies. First, radicalism is a response to ongoing conditions. Usually the response appears in the form of evaluation, rejection, or even resistance. Problems that are rejected can be in the form of assumptions, ideas, institutions or values that are seen as responsible for the sustainability of the rejected conditions (Widada 2022).

Second, radicalism does not stop at rejection, but continues to try to replace this order with another form of order. This characteristic shows that radicalism contains a separate program or view of idealism. Radicalists are trying hard to make this order a substitute for the existing order. Thus, in accordance with the meaning of the word 'radic', a radical attitude presupposes a desire to fundamentally change the situation.

Third, the strong belief of the radicals in the truth of the program or ideology they carry. This attitude is at the same time accompanied by a denial of the truth of another system to be replaced. In social movements, beliefs about the correctness of programs or philosophies are often combined with ways of achieving them in the name of ideal values such as democracy or humanity. However, the strength of this belief can lead to the emergence of emotional attitudes among radicalists.

The three categories above merely function as working hypotheses to help see issues that contain similarities. In other words, if a religious phenomenon only fulfills one or two criteria, it does not mean that it cannot be associated with radicalism. Conversely, if the phenomenon has more than three criteria, it also cannot be excluded from the radicalism category.

The term radicalism is also associated with religious movements within Islam which tend to reject conservative religious models and secular socio-political value systems. This movement was characterized by a desire to apply Islamic teachings as a whole in family, economic, political and cultural life (Kallen 1972). Radicalism is a form of religious awakening movement in Islam apart from revivalism and reformism movements.

In contrast to the views of revivalists and reformists, for Islamic radicalism groups, the ideal of Islam is not simply to return to the Qur'an and Sunnah or to seek a synthesis between Islamic values and the development of modern culture. Islam is a perfect and total teaching and has provided a set of rules that can be used for the life of the times. Therefore, Muslims do not need to borrow or look for other cultures to meet their needs. According to radicalists, the most

important thing is the application of Islamic principles as a whole in all areas of life. The steps that need to be taken are to uphold God's power and sovereignty in everyday life. This means that the Qur'an and Sunnah must be placed above human authority in all social institutions. Only Allah has the authority to determine the good and bad done by humans. This mindset is known as the principle of *Hakimiyyah* or placing God's power above everything.

Based on this belief, Islam is presented as a self-sufficient ideology and therefore tends to treat different ideologies or life practices as enemies or rivals. This makes them reject the modern order of life. Democracy is not recognized, because it places humans above the power of God.

Research Methods

This article focuses on government policy in solving the problem of religious radicalization and various efforts to reject this policy. So far there has been no research that really looks at how strategic changes occur in doctrinal efforts. In the data collection method, in-depth interviews were conducted related to the topics discussed. We selected our respondents purposively and comfortably to collect the required data and information from the selected respondents in this study. The primary data used in this study were obtained from several sources; books, scientific journals and other written documents that have been previously written by several experts. Apart from that, literature was also collected related to research problems, namely sites and social media accounts used by Islamist groups in rejecting government policies in solving religious radicalization, resistance carried out through recitations, influence on young people or students, as well as open resistance through rejection of religious and state holidays and rejection of other government policies.

This research is a qualitative research, using in-depth interviews as an instrument. The interviews (in-depth interviews) are intended to obtain a philosophical basis and reasoning for government policies in resolving religious radicalization. Informants in this study are the Government represented by the National Agency for Combating Acts of Terrorism which is given the responsibility to manage Radicalism. Besides that, the Islamist group which represents the group that wants to be researched, is fighting against government policies.

Descriptive-discursive analysis is used in this study. This is intended to explain the main issues discussed, namely how the rejection by Islamist groups towards state policies through social media, then how the rejection is carried out through social religious movements and open resistance by Islamist groups against government policies.

Islamist Groups Resistance Through Social Media

State policies in dealing with radicalism have faced a number of objections. The rejection that occurred manifested itself in various forms, both subtle and hard. Subtle rejection occurs through digital statements. The emergence of hundreds of radical websites and accounts detected by the Republic of Indonesia's National Counterterrorism Agency (well-known as BNPT) is the fact of this rejection. BNPT together with a number of other stakeholders in 2021 found 650 sites and accounts in cyberspace that have the potential to spread radical views. In detail, these sites and accounts can be seen in table 1 below:

Table 1. Radikal Sites and Accounts

No	Sites/Accounts	Total
1	General content containing rejection	409
2	Content against the Republic of Indonesia.	147
3	Anti-Pancasila content.	85
4	Anti-tolerance Content.	7
5	Content related to <i>takfiri</i> (making others unbelievers).	2
Total		650

Source: processed from research data

Table 1 shows that general content containing information against government policies is the most dominant site, with 409 contents. There were 147 anti-Republic of Indonesia content and 85 anti-Pancasila content. This number shows that the rejection that occurs massively through online media is in line with the increasing number of media users in Indonesia currently.

In order to anticipate of the spread of radical ideas; teaching violence, inciting or spreading hatred, the Ministry of Communication and Informatics of the Republic of Indonesia takes preventive measures in the digital corners by deleting and blocking sites that have been detected. From July 2017 to July 2020, there had been 16,056 contents (on social media and websites) related to terrorism that were blocked. Details of the distribution of terrorism-related content spread across various digital platforms can be seen in table 2 below:

Table 2. Blocked Websites

No	Digital Platforms	Total
1	Facebook	11.600
2	Twitter	2.282
3	Website	496
4	YouTube	678
5	File Sharing	1.000
Total		16.056

Source: processed from research data

Table 2 illustrates that the most used digital platform is Facebook. It is widely used (11,600) because it is easy to understand and operate. Besides Facebook, the use of Twitter and file sharing is also high as well as Website and YouTube users.

Among the sites blocked by the Ministry of Communication and Informatics of the Republic of Indonesia are manjanik.com, mikailkanie.wordpress.com, revolusiislam bersamaazzammedia.blogspot.co.id, langitmuslim.blogspot.co.id, kajiantauhid.blogspot.co.id, pendukungaulahislam.blogspot.co.id, muslimori1.blogspot.co.id (research data). In addition, Susetyo Dwi Prihadi on CNN Indonesia stated that there were 22 radical Islamic sites that were blocked by Kominfo: arrahmah.com, Voa-Islam.com, Panjimas.com, dakwatuna.com, thariquna.com, ghur4ba.blogspot.com, kalifamujahid.com, an-najah.net, muslimdaily.net, hidayatullah.com, salam-online.com, aqlislamiccenter.com, kiblat.net, dakwahmedia.com, muqawamah.com, lasdipo.com, gemaislam.com, eramuslim.com, daulahislam.com, shoutussalam.com, aazamedia.com, indonesiaupportislamicatate.blogspot.com. These sites were allegedly quite militant in spreading anti-radicalism content; hence the ministry blocked them.

The Resistance of Islamist Groups through Social Religious Activities

Rejection of deradicalization policies also occurs in the form of social-religious movements (Syauqi, n.d.). This rejection was carried out by Islamic groups. This group rejection model can be seen in several ways. First, rejection through religious teachings at mosques. A number of mosques used have been controlled, both management and the religious enthusiasm of the community at the mosques.

“Many mosques are only used as a place to perform fard prayers. After doing the prayers, the mosques are empty with no activity. This situation provides a great opportunity for certain groups to utilize the mosque as the center of all activities such as education, training, cadre, health, da’wah, and other activities. We cannot ban it because it will benefit the congregation” (Interview, Medan Mosque Management, 17 March 2021).

The control of the mosque by certain groups determines the direction and strategy of da'wah. In almost all areas, Radical Islamic groups are trying to control mosques; especially in determining the preacher and the tendency of the religious understanding adhered to.

“The mosque is a very decisive medium for carrying out da’wah activities. Taking control over

the mosque by a group will greatly determine da'wah activities and arouse the enthusiasm of Muslims. The sacredness of the mosque is very beneficial for doctrine and religious behavior, as well as in the context of provoking/rejecting everything that is considered contrary to religious teachings." (Interview, Bukittinggi Mosque Management, 21 November 2021).

The same thing was also conveyed by one of the congregation of the mosque:

"The congregation of a mosque who are used to a mosque, eventually have to move to another mosque, because the strategies, materials and management of the mosque are carried out in accordance with the understanding of the new group that controls the mosque. Because they already feel uneasy about carrying out worship at the mosque" (Interview, Congregation of the Mosque, Bukittinggi, 12 March 2022).

Second, resistance is carried out through influence on generations or students in higher institutions, both religious and public colleges. Influence on young people or students at religious and public colleges is carried out through religious organizations such as the Islamic Study Forum, Campus Da'wah Council and others. One of the informants, X said that:

"The government's program to deal with radicalism will not solve the problem, but increase the spirit of resistance groups instead." (Interview, FPI Headquarters, Bukittinggi, 10 Januari 2021).

Another informant, who is also an academic, also highlighted the existence of da'wah council in campus which thus far has deviated from the spirit of religion in a moderate way. He conveyed:

"Student activities at the Islamic Studies Forum actually decrease the spirit of introducing Islam as a peaceful religion. The da'wah activities that occurred actually lead students to act tough and reject state policies, especially those from the BNPT related to handling radical actions. In fact, students are braver to voice jihad to fight all forms of policies that are contrary to their ideas, even by means of violence" (Interview, FSI Management, UNP 3 November 2021).

The same thing is also found in several higher institutions, the exclusivity of knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of students in religion:

"Religious fanaticism is an important thing in order to maintain the authenticity of Islam, as well as cover the various changes brought about by modernization and globalization. Muslims must fight against groups and even countries that provide opportunities for the development of -isms that will destroy pure Islam." (Interview, LDK Management, UIN Padang, 5 Desember 2022).

This statement is in line with the results of research released by the Research Institute at Islamic State University (UIN in Indonesian) of Jakarta (2011), it is known that a survey with a sample of students from UIN of Jakarta, UIN of Yogyakarta, UIN of Makassar, UIN of Surabaya, UIN of Bandung, UIN of North Sumatra, and State Islamic Institute of Padang, regarding jihad using violence, 26.7 percent of the students agreed, 68.4 percent of them disagreed and 4.9 percent was abstained. Based on these data, more than 25 percent of students agreed with violent jihad. This is a serious warning to the entire academic community, society, and the government regarding how far the doctrine of anti-radicalism has infiltrated the creative areas of campus.

Stiff Resistance

In addition to subtle rejection, as previously described, Islamist groups have also responded to deradicalization policies openly, such as holding demonstrations involving large masses of people. One of the issues rejected, which is in stark contrast to the deradicalization program, is

the rejection of national holidays. National holidays are considered a product of the regime which is far from the spirit of Islam. In this case, for them, taking a day off on a national holiday means following the orders of a non-Islamic regime (Said, M. H. M., NASRUL, M. A. B. D., Hak, N. A., & Salim, n.d.). The belief that only Islamic holidays are followed is getting stronger because it is followed by activities in educational institutions which continue to run even though it coincides with national holidays such as teachers' day. In fact, they also refuse holidays that coincide with the celebration of the Prophet's birthday which is held every Rabiul Awal 12th which often coincides with the holiday version of the Christian calendar every year.

In addition to the strong rejection of national holidays, the rejection also occurred on the issue of banning the use of veil for women on campus. The demonstration that took place on March 21st 2018 at the Regional House of Representatives then continued to State Islamic Institute of Bukittinggi campus (IAIN in Indonesian abbreviation). It showed a wave of rejection which also contradicted the deradicalization policy. At that time, the leadership of IAIN issued a ban for students to wear the veil on campus and as a response to the appeal of the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia which continues to promote and realize religious moderation in PTKIN/PTKIS environments throughout Indonesia. Their rejection was based on the argument that the use of the veil is part of a person's human rights. This act of refusal also involved students who felt aggrieved due to the ban on the use of the veil on campus. One of the demonstration participants said that:

"IAIN should speak out loud about Islam, not follow a secular regime by prohibiting the use of Islamic attributes" (Interview, Gusrizal, 8 April 2018).

The action received various responses from the public. One who witnessed the demonstration said:

"Utilizing university students, in addition to views concerning the connection of the use of veil with Islamic radicalism, is clearly inappropriate. As Muslim intellectuals, they should be involved in rectifying such accusations, not joining in on it" (Interview, Busyra, 21 March 2018).

From these demonstrations, it can be seen that the doctrine of religious radicalism which targets young people and the academic community can be even more dangerous. This is because the anti-radicalism movement that they are carrying out is more structured and neatly organized, so that the campus becomes a strategic area for spreading the doctrine of anti-radicalism policy rejection.

Resistance through Digital Platform

Digital corner is the most decisive media in controlling and disseminating information to the public. Islamist groups have a large number of digital corners and control them in spreading their views and opposing the government. The blocking by the government and related parties (related to the prohibition of Islamic ideology) do not weaken their resistance movement. Instead, the government's actions have grown more sites and new accounts that are difficult to detect. There are three underlying reasons why resistance through digital corners is carried out. First, the world of information technology provides freedom for all parties to express and makes it easy for all parties to obtain information. Social media are also the representation of the new democracy in this millennial era because many people use it to protest government political policies (Apriyani 2021), especially in the context of spreading religious knowledge and understanding. This is an Islamist group's program to dominate the world; Because whoever controls technology means he controls the world. Besides that, the resistance of Islamist groups through social media is considered as jihad activities (fighting and being serious in the cause of Allah); Not only will you get a reward in this world, but you will also get happiness in the hereafter. So whatever and however the challenges faced must be fought. As explained, radical Islamic groups can survive because most of them are intellectuals who have a strategy to enter the circle of the younger

generation either through educational institutions, or through more modern methods that rely on information technology such as social media. (Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi 2010). The basic thing that they still understand is the acceptance of the notion of "violence in the name of religion", which is always modified and wrapped in patterns and methods that are more easily accepted by the wider community.

Second, Human Resources. Islamists have extraordinary abilities in creating digital corners as well as literacy skills in mastering communication. The headquarters of the Islamist groups must be equipped with adequate information technology facilities and infrastructure and become the main program. Interestingly, many controlled mosques or mosques founded by Islamist groups are equipped with Information Technology infrastructure which support their da'wah activities and resistance against the government.

Third, the doctrine or belief regarding the activities carried out. Spreading beliefs such as jihad through social media and social religious movements is an obligation that religious people should not ignore. Jihad is God's order to fight against rulers who do not carry out God's law or Islamic law. The theme of amar makruf nahi mungkar is the basis of a social-religious movement that gave birth to various forms of resistance activities, such as swiping, closing various locations that are considered contrary to the teachings of Pure Islam, and attacking groups or institutions that carry out activities that they consider to be contrary to Islamic law (Machfud Syaefudin 2014).

Fourth; Social media is an effective tool for recruiting and expanding networks in an effort to carry out movements. It doesn't take a lot of money and a long time to increase followers and friends in remote areas. So that the movement's strategy went according to the plans and agreements made by the Islamist groups to reject government policies.

Resistance through Religious Activity

Social religious movements such as recitations, especially through the younger generation, are effective agents in fighting against the government in solving religious radicalization. The transfer of religious knowledge related to radicalization is easier to explain to the public through lectures and preaching. Especially when it comes to the spirit of jihad and hijrah, besides the notion of intolerance (refusing to respect people of different religions), religious fanaticism (acknowledgement that our understanding or belief is the most correct (other people are wrong), as well as the attitude of disbelieving others (Muhammad Harfin 2017). In fact, Islamic groups that do not share their views are considered as infidels and must be fought. At this level, Islamist groups have the power to maintain agents of resistance against government policies, because they (Islamists) control mosques (not only limited to places of worship, but also the media in carrying out resistance). Meanwhile, on the other hand, the government does not have the authority to regulate the functions of mosques, because almost all mosques in the country are sourced from waqf, infaq and alms for the people, not financed by the government.

Resistance through religious social movements is intended: First; to unite the spirit of all Muslims who are no longer limited by the boundaries of transnational organizations/Islam. To show the international world that Islam in Indonesia has strength in fighting against the government. Preaching or Islamic study is one of the media to unite Muslims in the country and across countries. Second; Mutual resistance with the foundation of the unity of faith will foster the spirit of *jihad*, so that it has the potential to sacrifice property and even lives. Any treatment by Islamist groups when fighting against the government and based on belief or faith are considered as the right thing to do.

Open Resistance

The two models of resistance by Islamist groups against the government are strategies that are carried out concurrently. Each of them has the same strengths and opportunities as an effort to oppose government policies in resolving religious radicalization. Two models of resistance are run by different groups or people (Islamists) (Ahyar 2015).

The Islamist groups' rejection of government policies actually seemed to win the hearts and minds of the Islamic community, so that they received public sympathy and support (Qodir 1970). The strong resistance carried out by Islamist groups has been able to sway the opinion of the religious community, especially from fundamental Islamic groups, such as the Islamic Defenders Front, Indonesian Mujahidin Council, Islamic Community Front, *Jema'at Islamiyah* and others. It can be seen from the various statements made by Islamists in response to the government's attitude against Islamist groups' resistance.

A significant impact on the strong resistance carried out by Islamist groups is the deteriorating relations between Islamist groups and the government. Thus far, the relationship between the two has been covered by a sense of suspicion coming from incidents categorized as radical. Because the perpetrators of radical actions in several incidents were indicated as the members of religious groups (Islamists). Like the Habib Riziq case, which was considered as the criminalization of Islamist groups, was related to various radical actions. In addition, that resistance to government policies will narrow the space for Islamists to take part in creating security and order in the country.

To conclude, the Islamist group's rejection of State Policy is increasingly showing its intensity. Religious radicalism is not only demonstrated in violent and frontal ways, but uses a more subtle and intellectual strategy. Islamist groups who openly reject various government policies in solving the problem of religious radicalism. The group continues to grow and develop, and does not show a decrease in intensity. Variations of resistance and resistance models also show significant innovation. The control of the Islamist Group over digital space causes the government to close sites that contain opposition to the government. Likewise the resistance carried out through social religious movements carried out by Islamist groups. In addition to the open resistance that was carried out to reject the government's policy on radicalization. This gives a signal that Indonesian Islamist groups must be considered in making further policies.

This study confirms the results of previous research, that counter radicalism and deradicalization programs have not shown optimal results, with various program activities being carried out. It turns out that counter radicalism and deradicalization are still facing resistance, especially from Islamist groups. Because they (Islamists) consider that the resistance they are carrying out is a substantive teaching of the Islamic religion itself, on the contrary it is not an error or a limitation of understanding as perceived by others.

The research has a number of limitations in terms of small informants, limited cases, too qualitative. In line with that, further research is needed that accommodates a larger sample, involves more complete parties, to obtain more comprehensive and in-depth results and allows it to be used as a basis for policy.

References

- Ahcmat Ghufron. 2021. Administrator of the Rabbani Islamic Studies Forum (FSI), Padang State University. On Understanding of Islam. Interview on 3 November.
- Ahmad, Jafar; Firmanda, Hengki; Wafi, Mahmud Hibatul. 2023. Models and political attitudes of fundamentalist groups in Indonesian presidential elections. *Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun* 11 (2): 569-590.
- Ahmad Najib Burhani. 2018. Pluralism, liberalism and Islamism: Religious outlook of Muhammadiyah. *Studi Islamika* 25(3): 433-470.
- Ahyar, M. 2015. Membaca gerakan Islam radikal dan deradikalisasi gerakan Islam. *Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan* 23(1): 1-26.
- Al Qurtuby, S. 2020. The rise of Islamism and the future of Indonesian Islam. *Journal of International Studies (Malaysia)* 16(7): 105-128.
- Alpyspaeva, G. A., & Abdykarimova, S. 2022. Muslim educational institutions in Kazakhstan under the Anti-religious policy of the Soviet State in the 1920s. *European Journal of Contemporary Education* 11(1): 314-324.
- Andriyanov, V. N. 2017. The constitutional and legal basis of counteracting extremism. *Russian Journal of Criminology* 11(1): 32-42.

- Apriyani, T. 2021. Peran Sosial media pada gerakan protes massa aksi dan demokrasi baru di era digital. *Kalijaga Journal of Communication* 3(1): 17–30.
- Arake, L., Keri, I., & Hanafi, S. 2021. The radicalism prevention policy in State Islamic Religious Universities in South Sulawesi: An overview of maqasid syari'ah. *Jurnal Ilmiah Al-Syir'ah* 19(1): 71–90.
- Asrori, A. 2015. Radikalisme di Indonesia: Antara historisitas dan antropisitas. *Kalam* 9(2): 253–268.
- Busyra. 2018. Board of the West Sumatra Islamic Defenders Forum (FPI). On Veil and Radicalism. Interview on 21 March.
- Davidenko, M. A. 2022. Prevention of religious terrorism in the execution of the penal sanction of incarceration. In, E. G. Popkova, A. A. Polukhin, & J. V Ragulina (Eds.), *Towards an Increased Security: Green Innovations, Intellectual Property Protection and Information Security* (pp. 317–323). Caham: Springer zinternational Publishing Group.
- Facal, G. 2020. Islamic Defenders Front Militia (Front Pembela Islam) and its impact on Growing religious intolerance in Indonesia. *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8(1), 7–20.
- Faiqah, N., & Pransiska, T. 2018. Radikalisme Islam Vs Moderasi Islam: Upaya membangun wajah Islam Indonesia yang damai. *Al-Fikra: Jurnal Ilmiah Keislaman* 17(1), 33–60.
- Fauzan. 2021. Member of Mosque Management in Bukittinggi City. On Mosques as Congregational Provocation Media. Interview on 21 November 2021.
- Fytilli, M. 2022. Including the “Nation’s Enemies”: The long politics of recognition and restitution during the Third Greek Republic (1974–2006). *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 40(1): 195–222.
- Gómez, Bélanger, J. J., Chinchilla, J., Vázquez, A., Schumpe, B. M., Nisa, C. F., & Chiclana, S. 2021. Admiration for Islamist groups encourages self-sacrifice through identity fusion. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 8(54): 1–12.
- Gusrizal. 2018. Chairman of the Council of Indonesian Ulemas, West Sumatra, IAIN Islamic Scholars College. On Veil in Campus. Interview on 8 April.
- Hassan, M., Mattingly, D., & Nugent, E. R. 2022. Political control. *Annual Review of Political Science* 25(1): 155–174.
- Hj. Mohaiyadin, N. M., & Aman, A. 2021. Understanding the Issues of waqf at public university: preliminary findings. *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 20: 95–108.
- Kallen, H. M. 1972. Radicalism, In, Edwin R.A. Seligman (ed.). *Encyclopedia of Social Science*. New York: The Macmillan Company: Vols. XIII–XIV (pp. 51–54).
- Khairullin, T. R. 2022. Trends in political Islam: Transition towards liberalization. *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences* 92(S2): S100–S104.
- Machfud Syaefudin. 2014. Reinterpretasi gerakan dakwah Front Pembela Islam (FPI). *Jurnal Ilmu Dakwah* 34(2): 259–276.
- Maliki, I. A., Nasrudin, M., Mukti, D. A., & Robiansyah, R. 2022. Rekonstruksi tafsir ayat-ayat berpotensi tatharruf dengan perspektif dengan perspektif Islam washathiyah di era pandemi. *Moderatio: Jurnal Moderasi Beragama* 2(1): 47–56.
- Md Sham, F., Yaqin, A., & Wachidah, H. N. 2021. Moral Reasoning theory: between Kohlberg ‘s and al-Ghazali’s perspective. *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 20: 25–33.
- Muhammad Hanif. 2021. Member of Mosque Management in Medan City. On Mastery of Mosque Management. Interview on 17 March.
- Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi. 2010. Fundamentalisme dan upaya deradikalisasi pemahaman al-Quran dan Hadis. *Religia* 13(1): 81–102.
- Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi. 2017. Radikalisme Agama dan upaya deradikalisasi pemahaman keagamaan. *Akademika* 22(1): 199–224.
- Mukhlis, M., & Makhya, S. 2020. Model kolaborasi kebijakan deradikalisasi agama berbasis pondok pesantren. *Jurnal SMART (Studi Masyarakat, Religi, Dan Tradisi)* 6(1): 63–79.
- Nasran. 2021. FPI Bukittinggi Member. Regarding the Deradicalization Program. Interview on 10 January.
- Olsson, S. 2021. Hizb ut-Tahrir’s caliphal counter-narrative. *Religions* 12(7): 1–13.

- Qodir, Z. 1970. Deradikalisasi Islam dalam perspektif pendidikan agama. *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 2(1): 85–107.
- Rismawati, S. D., Qomariyah, S., Devy, H. S., Maisyal, N., & A'yun, Q. 2021. The legal politics of religious moderation in Indonesia: Responsive or repressive? *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues* 24(4): 1–14.
- Said, M. H. M., Amrullah, M., Ahmad, N. A. H., & Salim, W. N. M. 2021. Muslim estate administration: The locus of Malaysian syariah court in Malaysia. *International Journal of Islamic Thought*, 19: 73–78.
- Sarsembayev, R., Aitymbetov, N., Tleubayev, S., & Aldiyarova, Z. 2021. Islamic revival in Kazakhstan: State Policy. *Central Asia and The Caucasus* 22(3): 168–180.
- Shukuralieva, N., & Lipiński, A. 2021. Islamic extremism and terrorism in Central Asia: A Critical analysis. *Central Asia and The Caucasus* 22(1): 106–117.
- Solikhah Nur Chamidah. 2021. Manager of the UIN Padang Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK). On Religious Fanaticism. Interview on 5 December.
- Sun, W. L., & Valenzuela, A. 2021. Reframing policy discourse on the school-to-prison pipeline. *Urban Review* 2(53): 708–732.
- Syauqi, A. 2022. Retracing jihad: A comparative study between Said Nursi and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 22 :35–41.
- Weill, S. 2020. Transnational Jihadism and the role of criminal judges: An ethnography of French Courts. *Journal of Law and Society* 47(S1): 30–53.
- Widada, T. 2022. Pelibatan mantan narapidana teroris (NAPITER) dalam mencegah radikalisme melalui program deradikalisasi. *Tanggon Kosala* 11(2): 390–405.
- Winarni, L. N. 2020. Eksistensi Pancasila dalam menghadapi ancaman kebhinekaan. *Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum Dan Keadilan* 8(1): 89–96.
- Yang, L., & Kozhirova, S. 2021. The state policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the field of combating religious extremism. In *Springer Geography* (pp. 161–170).
- Zulfadli, Z. 2022. Review buku Konservatisme Islam: Politik Identitas dan Kelompok Islamis di Indonesia. *Jurnal Penelitian Politik* 19(2):145–158.