

The Politico-*da'wah* Approaches of Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) : A Historical Review

BADLIHISHAM MOHD NASIR

Our political activities should relate to the entire role of Islamic *da'wah* and the *Manhaj* (method) of *da'wah*. We have to streamline our political activities in order to raise the sympathy and support of the people towards the Islamic objectives that we are struggling for. Our movement is a unique movement which possesses its own characteristics. We are not merely a political party or just a *da'wah* movement. Our movement is compact: we are active in politics as well as *da'wah*. We are using politics for the achievement of *da'wah* and we are performing *da'wah* to strengthen politics.¹

Those declarations that were pronounced by the PAS leaders clearly suggest that the party regards politics and *da'wah* as a combined task. In other words, politics is used as a means or instrument to achieve the objective of *da'wah* in Islam or vice versa. This statement is also important in order to prove that PAS is also a movement of *da'wah*, not only a political party which seems to be greatly involved for the ballot hunting. The trend that gradually emerged in the party since the emergence of Islamic resurgence or *da'wah* in the early 1970 had recently become popular in the country.² This essay will chronologically describe and discuss some important political activities leading to the implementation of PAS' *da'wah* objectives that cover three important periods namely the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

THE POLITICAL APPROACHES IN 1970S

Historically, one may say that PAS did not make much headway in implementing its Islamic idealism in Malaysia. As an Islamic opposition party in a multi-racial country, PAS only succeeded in dominating Kelantan (1957-1978) and Terengganu (1959-1961). Due to many problems, PAS also failed to implement a total Islamic State or even to initiate massive Islamisation programmes. This can be observed as early as the second half of the 1960s, when the Pemuda PAS (Youth Wing of PAS) presented a paper criticising their leaders for allegedly failing to imple-

ment the Islamic principles of the party on matters relating to the sale of alcohol, prostitution and gambling in the state of Kelantan which PAS was governing.³

What was clear to the public was the attitude of PAS in criticising UMNO frequently for any failures in the government, particularly pertaining to non-Islamic issues. This attitude was probably suitable for PAS as an opposition party, which demands the ruling party to be more committed to the implementation of Islam in the country. However, this situation changed when PAS decided to join the National Front in 1974. Apart from strengthening the political legitimacy of Malays and as a mean of discussing the financial problems faced by the Kelantan state government,⁴ the coalition was also seen by PAS as a clever tactic to undermine UMNO by making PAS indispensable to it as a long-term partner.⁵

Although there has been no clear statement ever made by Asri, this political strategy is presumably embodied in the motive for da'wah. This is shown in the paper of the party secretary which was intended to promote national unity in the true spirit of Islamic brotherhood, to implement its party objectives together with UMNO, particularly in the improvement of the economic position of the Malays, the propagation of Islam (da'wah) and the implementation of a Malay-oriented education policy.⁶ PAS leaders also supported this *Tahalluf Siyasi* (political understanding) insisting that the party should learn lessons from the failure of the *Ikhwan al-Muslimun*. The Egyptian President, Gamal Nasser, they added, had banned al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun when the latter showed signs of being too powerful and dangerous for the revolutionary government under his leadership. Using the Nasser-Ikhwan experience as a parallel situation, they argued that if PAS did not join the coalition, its future would be jeopardised, including the possibility of being banned if it became too militant.⁷

In line with the above purposes, PAS leaders argued that the proposed coalition was in accordance to the fundamental tenets of the Qur'an. Finally, PAS openly proposed to its members in its Eighth Congress in July 1972 that the coalition should go ahead as long as it did not compromise the basic principles of PAS.⁸ This proposal, however, was rejected by those influenced by the *Dewan Ulama* (the Council of Ulama) who thought that the decision was only based on the *Usul Fiqh*, without referring to more concrete *Nas* from the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. Moreover, they argued that PAS had also deviated from its original principles based on the teachings of Islam. They also, without consulting the other party

leaders, opposed the decision to join the National Front because they were doubtful of the sincerity of UMNO about cooperating with PAS. Although the proposal only won 100 out of the 190 votes, the coalition was finally agreed in 1973.⁹ The agreement, which was officially signed on the 1 January 1973, included thirteen points, as follows:

A ministry, that is the Ministry of Land and Special Tasks, which shall be responsible for land matters and other things that shall be decided later by the Prime Minister, shall be allocated to PAS.

A Minister shall also be appointed, with the consent of the rulers, to be the Deputy Chairman for the Council of Islamic Religious Affairs for Malaysia.

The posts of Deputy Minister, Parliamentary Secretaries, Political Secretary and others may be filled after the consultation of the Ministers with the Prime Minister, and upon his approval.

The Prime Ministers will consider prospective candidates suggested by PAS to be appointed Senators whenever there are vacancies.

The Prime Minister will consider qualified PAS members to accompany his overseas visits and for appropriate overseas posts.

The government will consider any PAS members who are qualified for boards and councils.

Two Kelantan State Assemblymen from the Alliance shall be appointed to the State Executive Council (Exco).

Two State Assemblymen each from the states of Kedah and Terengganu will be appointed to the Exco.

As long as the coalition exists, there must be no competition between PAS and Alliance in the by-elections, except in areas where other parties had won. This provision is subject to consultation by both sides.

Similarly, in areas won by PAS in the 1969 election, if the member resigns from PAS, and if there is thereby a by-election, a consultation must first be sought; if no agreement can be achieved, a competition should be allowed.

There shall be no agreement on the coming general election. All related matters shall be discussed when the time comes.

The freedom of PAS members in the cabinet, Exco, Parliament, and the state

assemblies, objecting to any proposals or laws that are contrary to Islam, shall be guaranteed.

A Liaison Committee shall be formed consisting of PAS and Alliance members.¹⁰

As a coalition government, PAS and Alliance further agreed on several other principles, on which they would strive together. The principles are as follows:

PAS, through the coalition government, aims to build a nation of peace, harmony and which possesses good spiritual and moral values. Therefore, the people's spiritual development can be related to efforts in material development. This will be parallel with the concept of Islam being the official religion, and with the principles of the National Pillars, so that spiritual values will continue to be the main core in the country's development.

Towards the perfection of the above principles, PAS with Alliance will strive to inculcate Islamic values into the law and state constitution.

PAS and the Alliance aim to implement the New Economic Policy diligently, with honesty, with no discriminations, until the objectives to create a balance in social and economic affairs between the rich and the poor as well as to abolish poverty in the society, have succeeded.

PAS and the Alliance determine to create a culture based upon the Malay culture, which does not contradict aspects of Islam.

PAS and the Alliance aim to preserve the country's security and to eliminate any domestic and foreign threats and, for this purpose, the country's defence system will be streamlined and expanded alongside the objectives to create a national competence to defend itself.

PAS and the Alliance determine to preserve the free and active Maritime Policy and will continue to endeavour with the concept of non-aligned participation of South-East-Asian countries to ensure peace in the region and to strive for good diplomatic affairs with other countries, especially Muslim countries.¹¹

Infused with the above agreement, PAS invented a new approach of working from within the system of the government. Many PAS members were appointed to several posts in the cabinet. Asri whose post was the Minister of Land, Mining and Special Tasks was also appointed as the Deputy Chairman of the Islamic National Affairs Council (*Majlis*

Kebangsaan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam). Another PAS member, Hassan Adli, the Minister of Local Government and Federal Territory, was also named the Deputy Chairman of the Malaysian Islamic *Da'wah* Foundation (*Yayasan Da'wah Islamiah Malaysia*).¹² Based on these opportunities, a well-known programme, also supported and participated in by ABIM, called *Bulan Da'wah* (*Da'wah* Month), was launched in 1978. This event was of special significance because the Islamic resurgence was beginning to be felt and the Islamic tide was beginning to sweep the country. In brief, the programme did not only gather many Islamic movements and organisations together but also indicated the interest of the government to deal with the resurgence of Islam or *da'wah* in the 1970s.¹³

Some other significant contributions made by PAS included the banning of advertisements for alcohol, the government-run to and Social Welfare lotteries on the television. The practice of serving alcohol at all government and state functions, such as banquets, was also stopped. PAS also kept pressure on the Ministry of Law to amend some parts of the constitution that are not in line with Islamic teachings. The party also demanded the setting up of many institutions for Islam including the Islamic Teachers' Training College (*Maktab Perguruan Islam*). Nevertheless, the activity of *da'wah* of PAS, particularly in the *Felda* scheme (Federal Land Development Association) received negative responses from UMNO because it was evident that more people came forward to join PAS. As a consequence of this and several other issues, PAS was expelled from the coalition government in 1978.¹⁴

THE POLITICAL APPROACHES IN 1980S

The new guard who took over the leadership in 1982 enthusiastically promoted several new political strategies and activities. They were among the former leaders of ABIM such as Fadhil Noor, Haji Hadi Awang and Syed Abdul Rahman, who joined ABIM in the late 1970s. Unlike the previous approach, which concentrated on Malay unity, the new leadership of PAS initiated several political approaches to non-Malays. This can be seen from the brave attempt of proclaiming *da'wah* towards the Chinese community in 1985, when a symposium entitled *Seminar Perpaduan Rakyat* (Seminar on People's Unity) was organised by PAS at the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall. The banners of the symposium, which were written in the Chinese language, were seen as the first approach in breaking the deadlock in its relationship with non-

Muslims. Speaking in its opening ceremony, its new President, Yusof Rawa called on the Muslims to put aside their racial arrogance. He suggested that by respecting one another other's values and norms, national unity would be preserved in harmony.¹⁵

Furthermore, PAS developed a more liberal attitude when Abdul Hadi declared that if PAS ruled the country, non-Malays would also be considered as possible candidates for the post of Prime Minister, as long as they were Muslims. He also promised that the rights of the non-Muslims would be preserved. In order to be more convincing in his promises, he also drew on the example of the Prophet Mohammad's just ruling of Madina and the rulings of the four righteous Caliphs of Islam.¹⁶

The initial response to PAS' meeting with a section of the Chinese community was quite enthusiastic. Subsequently, encouraged by these developments, and in part due to the approaching 1986 general election, PAS sponsored the formation of the Chinese Consultative Council or CCC (*Majlis Pemuaafakatan Cina*). The best PAS-CCC pact, which was initiated by the Perak-based CCC, agreed that:

All people are equal and all cultures, languages and religions shall be respected and allowed.

There shall be no classification of people into the 'conqueror' and 'conquered' of the 'Bumiputera' and 'Non-Bumiputera'.

Any person who believes and deserves the true, almighty and just God, and who has good moral character, wisdom and dedication shall be allowed and accepted to hold office of high authority.

The basis of all policies shall be equality, fairness, righteousness, justice, democracy, and for the interests of the people.

There shall be two systems of law. The Islamic law will govern Muslims while the secular law will govern non-Muslims.

All minority interests shall be protected.

While the Ulama will be consulted, the country shall be ruled by an elected Parliament.

No one shall be compelled to convert to the Muslim faith, and a Muslim will be allowed to stay with his non-Muslim family.¹⁷

The open attitude of PAS was further manifested when it decided to form another pact with other opposition parties. The new approach involved the ostensibly 'multi-ethnic' parties, representing NASMA (Nationalist Malaysian Party), PSRM (The Socialist Party of Malaysia) and SDP (Sepakat Democratic Party). For PAS, this was another *Tahalluf Siyasi* (political approach), known as *Harakah Keadilan Rakyat* (The People's Justice Movement) which was formed on 15 July 1986; its purpose was to reduce the two-thirds majority of the National Front as well as to break the barrier between PAS and other different party ideologies.¹⁸

While confined by UMNO domination during the coalition government, PAS could gain an advantage from this political approach because all the above parties agreed with PAS' right to establish an Islamic state and to practise Islam as al-Din (the way of life). Moreover, they were on the same track in criticising the government for the fabric of Malaysian life due to oppression, corruption, arrogance, *Asabiyyah* and the misuse of power.¹⁹ However, PAS suffered a great defeat in the 1986 General Election, managing to win only one parliamentary seat in Pengkalan Chepa, Kelantan.

THE POLITICAL APPROACHES IN 1990S

This heaviest defeat experienced by PAS incited the claim that its approach, or the idea of political da'wah, was no longer suitable for the party. PAS refused to implement the idea that it should remain a party for the Malays and leave the task of spreading the message of Islam to other Islamic movements or *Da'wah* bodies. Thus, despite PAS' floundering attempts in strategizing political action, the party once again, in facing the 1990 General Election, sought a *Tahalluf Siyasi* (political understanding) with other opposition parties. There were probably two main reasons behind this action. Firstly, PAS that usually desired power could no longer contest the parliamentary as well as state seats on its own. Secondly, members of PAS in Kelantan felt that this general election was the most favourable time for PAS to regain control over Kelantan, because the UMNO-led Kelantan was having serious leadership problems. Moreover, the 'new enemy' of UMNO, Tengku Razaleigh, who was the President of *Semangat 46* (Spirit of 46), enjoyed a considerable support in his home base.²⁰

These and other factors finally forced PAS' leadership to contemplate a possible coalition with the *Semangat 46*. The decision had also

been justified by the PAS ulama, viewing it from the perspective of *Shari'ah*. Abdul Hadi, for example, argued that *Tahalluf* was needed depending on the time and the nature of the challenges. He suggested that the *Tahalluf* occurred at two levels of political development: first, the level of establishing political development, and second, the level of forming a political alliance. On the level of forming a coalition government, Abdul Hadi said that political interests must serve the interests of Islam, recognising the formation of an Islamic state and accepting an Islamic institution based on *Shari'ah*. A political alliance, he argued, might be formed under the circumstances of facing great enemies, for resisting injustice, or to check corruption. This alliance should only be considered as a temporary measure, and without specific binding that might contradict Islamic principles and movements.²¹

Moreover, Semangat 46, as a new party which was desperate for survival, accepted PAS' proposal of Islam being the principle of the co-operation. As a result, PAS finally agreed, in May 1989, to form an alliance with Semangat 46, Berjasa and Hamim, in a coalition called *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah* or APU (the Organisation for the Integration of the Muslim Community/Ummah Solidarity Group). PAS also gained support from Kongres India Muslim Malaysia or Kimma (the Malaysian Congress of Indian Muslims).²² However, there were rumours saying that *Semangat 46* had secretly formed a *Gagasan Rakyat* (People's Force) which became a huge problem for PAS. This was because UMNO had manipulated this issue by accusing PAS and Semangat 46 of betraying the Malays and Islam.²³

Consequently, this approach caused tension among PAS members. Some PAS members in Kelantan rejected this idea. They, at the beginning, argued about the sincerity of *Semangat 46* and viewed it as no different from UMNO. Moreover, influenced by the UMNO Deputy President, Ghaffar Baba, who invited PAS to discuss the matter of an Islamic state, Wan Ismail, one of the key persons who was dissatisfied with the alliance between PAS and *Semangat 46*, suggested that co-operation with UMNO seems to be more Islamic with its Islamisation programmes. Wan Ismail finally withdrew from PAS and founded a group known as *al-Islah* (the Reform).²⁴

However, the idea proposed by *al-Islah* was rejected by PAS and the party launched its manifesto called *Membangun bersama Islam* (the Way Forward with Islam) for the 1990 General Election.²⁵ The strategy of *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah* finally proved successful. Despite the National Front's two-thirds majority, the PAS-APU alliance wrested

total control of Kelantan, winning all 39 seats. The nature of power-sharing in this case differed radically from the first experience with the National Front, because it was PAS that decided the policies of the alliance, giving the Islamic movement a tremendous boost.²⁶ This was also the time for PAS to realise its concept of Ulama leadership (*Kepimpinan Ulama*) when they appointed Nik Abdul Aziz as the new Chief Minister of Kelantan.²⁷ This opportunity, of course, would be further utilised by PAS to form the model of an Islamic state which they had repeatedly called for since before the country's independence. In general, the tolerant and subtle approach of PAS in implementing its idea of Islamic state gradually attracted the people, Muslim and non-Muslim in Kelantan.²⁸

In the 1995 General Election, however, the strength of the coalition between PAS and Semangat 46 was disturbed when UMNO won several state and parliamentary seats in Kelantan. Although PAS defended all the seats it won in the last General Election, some seats belonging to the party Semangat 46 were captured by UMNO. Finally, Tengku Razaleigh, the leader of Semangat 46 announced the dispersion of the party and rejoined UMNO for the spirit of Malay unity in April 1996. As a result, the Sultan of Kelantan, who was strongly backing the Angkatan government in Kelantan and also the father-in-law of Tengku Razaleigh, gradually withdrew his support.²⁹ The fall down of Semangat 46 did not actually succeed in persuading all of its members to join UMNO because many of its supporters, particularly those in the lower ranks or ordinary members, joined PAS instead. Two examples are the Semangat 46 state assemblymen, Hussein Ahmad and Nordin Yaacob, who joined PAS with thousands of their followers.³⁰ This, of course, further more strengthened the party grassroots in Kelantan.

However, the great opportunity of gaining mass support appear due to the drama of expelling Anwar Ibrahim from the government in September 1998. Political crisis in UMNO and government has been manipulated by PAS to attract those supporters and sympathisers of Anwar to become a party member.³¹ PAS claimed that the application for the party members has been greatly increased since the Anwar's case. Apart from this, PAS also led a cooperation with some other opposition parties namely *Parti Keadilan* (founded by Dr. Wan Azizah, the wife of Anwar), PSM (Socialist Party of Malaysia) and DAP (Democratic Action Party). This opposition coalition, who denounced the slogan of striving for justice, has further enjoyed supports from Muslim and non-Muslim NGO (non-government organisations) such as SUARAM (Malaysian

Voice), *Tenaganita* and *TERAS* (Malay Entrepreneur Group).³² Some *da'wah* movements such as ABIM (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement) and JIM (Islamic Representative Council) secretly supported Anwar in the government and disagreed with PAS' political approaches now then turned to cooperate with the coalition.³³

In order to win support from non-Muslim in facing the 1999 general election, PAS had tactically proposed to drop the clause of establishing an Islamic state from the party constitution. Dato' Nik Abdul Aziz, the party Supreme Guide argued that this would not mean the party will totally ignore its main objective of establishing a country which based on the principle of Islam. He drew the example of the Prophet's method of *da'wah* who did not bother not to be called by the Qurasyh as the messenger of Allah (*Rasulullah*) in the treaty of *Hudaybiyyah*. He who claimed that this tactical move has later enable Muslim to enter Mecca peacefully also suggested that the party should concentrate on the matter of justice which he expected could bring all people to work together.³⁴ Nevertheless, non-Muslim declined to support PAS although the party had successfully regained power in Kelantan and recaptured Terengganu, the producer of Malaysian petroleum and gas. Non-Muslim's votes mostly went to the National Front although the party won many seats in Kedah, Pahang, Perak and Selangor, besides increased its popular votes in other states controlled by the ruling party. In brief, the majority of the non-Muslims refused to positively response to the politico-*da'wah* approach of PAS although it seems to be workable among Malays.³⁵

CONCLUSION

From the above review, one may conclude that the influence of *da'wah* in many of PAS political approaches become too significant to the party. This so-called political-*da'wah* approach has promoted PAS with more 'Islamic' image compared to the previous leadership who greatly emphasized in the Malay interest. Although this great emphasis on Islam has attracted more Malay supports as indicated in the last general election, such approach is still unable to turn non-Muslims to PAS. Several assumptions could be made upon this phenomenon. First, this religious oriented approach is still far from the understanding of many Malaysians, particularly non-Muslims. Second, there should be some weaknesses in the PAS politico-*da'wah* approach that unable to wipe out the misunderstanding of the non-Muslims about Islam. Third, the non-Muslims tend to see PAS in a very prejudice perspective. They still

perceive that the party who is using Islam for its cause is a treat to other religious freedom. Fourthly, such secularistic approach which promoted by the PAS' opponent has still dominated the political situation in the country. Therefore, it is impossible to drastically change this perception whether among Muslims or non-Muslims, except further struggle of disseminating the message of Islam among the Malaysian citizens.

NOTES

1 The declarations on da'wah were made by Yusof Rawa and Fadhil Noor in their presidential speeches at the party conferences. See Badlihisham Mohd Nasir, '*Da'wah* in PAS : A Study of the Pronouncements of the Party Leaders' in *Jurnal Fikrah*, vol. 2, January-Disember 1999.

2 It is strongly suggested that the resurgence of da'wah in the early 1970s had influenced PAS to firstly incorporate the clause for da'wah in its constitution dated 22 June 1978. The clause provides; 'o call (menyeru) the people to the Shariah of Allah and the Sunnah of the Prophet through da'wah in words, writing and action.'

3 Zulkifli Abd. Ghani, *Diffusion of Da'wah Through Broadcasting Media: The Experience of Radio Television Malaysia*, unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Edinburgh 1995, p.65. Further critical evaluation about the administration of PAS in Kelantan during the reign of Asri, see Alias Mohamed, *Kelantan di Bawah Pemerintahan PAS: Masalah Tanah dan Rasuah*, Gateway Publishing House, Petaling Jaya, 1994 and *Kelantan: Politik dan Dilema Pembangunan*, Utusan Melayu Publications, Kuala Lumpur, 1975.

4 Asri, *Memoir Politik Asri Meniti Arus*, p.89-90. Also see Syed Hussin Ali, *The Malay: Their Problems and Future*, Longman, Kuala Lumpur, 1987, p.37.

5 Alias Mohamed, *PAS' Platform Development and Change, 1951-1986*, Gateway Publishing House, Petaling Jaya, 1994, p.126. Also see Chamil Wariya, *Politik Kompromi*, Publishing And Distributors, Kuala Lumpur, 1989, p.67.

6 Alias Mohamed, *PAS' Platform Development and Change, 1951-1986*, p.121.

7 Ibid, p.142.

8 Abu Bakar Hamzah, *Parti PAS Dengan Tahalluf Siyasinya*, Media Cendekiawan, Kuala Lumpur, 1922), p.8.

9 N.J. Funston, *Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS*, Heinemann Educational Books, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, p.121. Also see Halim Mahmud, *Asri Muda Dalam Dilema*, Hafar Enterprise, Kuala Lumpur, 1983, p.41.

10 Pejabat Agung, *Persatuan Islam se-Tanah Melayu (PAS) and Alliance Members*. Also see Asri Muda, *Memoir Politik Asri Meniti Arus*, p.91-93.

11 Ibid.

12 Other PAS members who were appointed to cabinet posts are Yusof Rawa (Deputy Minister of Prime Industry), Abu Bakar Omar (Deputy Minister of Health), Abu Bakar Hamzah (Parliament Secretary of the State Rural and Development Ministry), Zahari Awang (Parliament Secretary of the Foreign Ministry), Mustapha Ali (Parliament Secretary of the Industry Ministry) and Wahab Yunus (Parliament Secretary of the Finance Ministry). See Asri Muda, *Memoir Politik Asri Meniti Arus*, pp.98-100.

13 Mustapha Ali, 'Malaysia' in Azzam Tamimi, *Power Sharing Islam?*, Liberty, London, 1993, pp.115-116.

14 Ibid., p.117. Also see Norhashimah Yasin, 'Islamisation or Malayisation? A Study on the Role of Islamic Law in the Economic Development of Malaysia: 1969-1993', Ph.D. thesis, University of Warwick, 1994.

15 Utusan Malaysia, February 11th 1985.

16 Chandra Muzaffar, *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*, Fajar Bakti, Petaling Jaya, 1987, p. 92. Also see Utusan Malaysia, 13 February 1985.

17 New Sunday Times, 13 July 1986.

18 Era, 21 July 1986; Dewan Masyarakat, August 1986, and Abu Bakar Hamzah, *PAS dengan Tahalluf Siyasinya*, p.36.

19 Harian Kota, 17 July 1986.

20 Zambri Abdul Kadir, 'Religion and Politics: The Search for Political Legitimacy of the Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Temple University, USA, 1996, pp.352-353.

21 Abu Bakar Hamzah, *Parti PAS dengan Tahalluf Siyasinya*, p.70. *Al-Ummah*, September 1989

22 Harakah, 12 October 1990.

23 *Gagasan Rakyat* (People's Force) is thought to consist of the Semangat 46, DAP (Democratic Action Party) and *Parti Bersatu Sabah* or PBS (United Party of Sabah). Besides DAP which was commonly associated with the anti-Malay attitude, PBS was portrayed by UMNO as a fanatic Christian party which would become a threat to Malays if they won the General Election.

24 Those who disagreed with PAS' decisions later formed a party called *Angkatan Keadilan Islah Malaysia* (AKIM - the Islah Movement of Malaysia). They contested in the 1995 general election for the state seat of Kelantan. This new party which was allegedly getting support from UMNO in its political strategies however, never won any seat and hence most of their candidates lost their deposits. Harakah, 16 October 1990.

25 See 'Membangun Bersama Islam Manifesto Politik/Pilihanraya PAS 1990', published by Lajnah Penerangan PAS Pusat. Dewan Masyarakat, 10 October 1989 and Harakah 22 October 1990.

26 Mustapha Ali, 'Malaysia' in Azzam Tamimi, *Power-Sharing Islam*, p.121.

27 Utusan Malaysia, 22 October 1990.

28 Officially, PAS unable to amend the state constitution to an Islamic state

but the party rather introduced clean government and many changes which reflected its concern with Islam.

29 The Daily Telegraph, 29 April 1995.

30 Utusan Malaysia, 22 April 1996 and Berita Harian, 8 July 1996.

31 Utusan Malaysia, 20 July 1997; Harakah, 6 December 1996, Harakah, 15 December 1997 and Harakah, 20 May 1996.

32 Utusan Malaysia, 3 September 1998; Berita Harian 3 September 1998.

33 Detik, vol. 5, 1999.

34 For further information about the clash among Islamic movements in Malaysia especially on the matter of da'wah see Badlihisam Mohd Nasir, 'Islamic Movements in Malaysia: A Change and Challenge in the Post Islamic Resurgence Period' in Hamdard Islamicus, vol. XXII, no. 1, January-March 1999, pp. 27-36.

35 Berita Harian 24 Jun 1999.

36 Malay support towards PAS is inconsistent. For example, PAS was defeated in the by-election of Sanggang in 1 April 2000. The BN candidate won with a big majority compared to the last general election in 1999. As expected, the majority of non-Muslims voted for BN.